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Abstract
Background: Eyewitness recalls and accident records frequently do not mention the conditions and behaviors of interest to
researchers and lead to missing values and to uncertainty about the prevalence of these conditions and behaviors
surrounding accidents. Missing values may occur because eyewitnesses report the presence but not the absence of obvious
clues/accident features. We examined this possibility.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants watched car accident videos and were asked to recall as much information as
they could remember about each accident. The results showed that eyewitnesses were far more likely to report the
presence of present obvious clues than the absence of absent obvious clues even though they were aware of their absence.
Conclusions: One of the principal mechanisms causing missing values may be eyewitnesses’ tendency to not report the
absence of obvious features. We discuss the implications of our findings for both retrospective and prospective analyses of
accident records, and illustrate the consequences of adopting inappropriate assumptions about the meaning of missing
values using the Avaluator Avalanche Accident Prevention Card.
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Introduction
Accident records are frequently used to learn about conditions
and participant behaviors before, during, and after accidents.
However, accident records frequently do not mention the con-
ditions and/or behavior of interest to researchers and lead to
missing values. In turn, missing values lead to uncertainty about
the prevalence of conditions and behavior surrounding accidents
as researchers are unable to establish from the records whether, for
example, a road was dry, wet, or covered by snow. What do these
missing values mean? First, accumulated evidence from memory
and cognition research demonstrates that if eyewitnesses do not
notice conditions or behaviors, they will not remember them and
not mention them [1,2]. Thus, missing values may occur because
eyewitnesses did not notice the conditions and behaviors. Second,
eyewitness are likely to encode and therefore to remember
obvious, distinctive, and important features of events and less
likely to remember detailed, non-distinctive, and unimportant
features as obvious, distinctive, and important features are
typically remembered better [2,3]. Thus, missing values may
occur because the information of interest to researchers was too
detailed, non-distinctive, and unimportant for eyewitnesses to
encode. Accordingly, we would expect eyewitnesses to encode and
to remember such obvious features of accidents as whether it was
snowing, raining, or dry and sunny; whether one car hit the other
or the other way around; whether visibility was reduced by snow,
rain, fog, or darkness; or whether a driver was distracted by
looking for a cell phone dropped on a car floor.
However, even though eyewitnesses encode specific information
and even though they remember it, they may not necessarily
report it when asked to describe what happened. Intuitively,
eyewitnesses typically have no reason to report the absence of
conditions that, when present, increase the risk of accidents (e.g.,
rain and snow in case of motor vehicle accidents). They are more
likely to focus on and report the presence of conditions and behavior
that they believe cause or contribute to the accident’s occurrence
(e.g., rain, snow, reduced visibility, distraction, failure to yield).
Similarly, people who experience problems with their cars tend to
report to their mechanics the presence of problems that indicate
something is wrong (e.g., clunking sound from the engine
compartment) and are unlikely to give the mechanic a long list
of the car components that are working just fine (e.g., the
windshield is not broken and does not need to be looked at). Thus,
missing values in accident records can occur for at least two main
reasons: eyewitnesses did not encode the sought-after information
because they did not notice it, and/or eyewitnesses did encode the
information (e.g., the absence of obvious clues) but did not report it
[4].
When analyzing accident records for the presence or absence
of obvious features that any victim or observer would notice,
researchers often assume that if obvious features are not men-
tioned in records, they did not occur (i.e., that missing values
indicate absence) [5–7]. For example, in a recent narrative text
analysis of tractor fatality reports, the researchers assumed that
when a report did not mention a tractor rollover, the rollover did
not occur [5] and retained all accident records in their analyses.
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the presence of various accident features. Yet another approach to
missing values – the list-wise elimination of all records with missing
values – was taken by Haegeli and McCammon [8,9] in develop-
ing the Avaluator Avalanche Accident Prevention Card designed
to reduce the number of avalanche accidents in Canada.
Specifically, Haegeli and McCammon started with over 1,400
avalanche accident records and for each accident record they
determined whether each of the seven so-called Obvious Clue (i.e.,
clues that any participant or eyewitness is certain or nearly certain
to notice) was present, absent, or indeterminate from the accident
record. Next, they eliminated 1,142 records or 82% of their
sample because the status of at least one of the obvious clue was
indeterminate (i.e., resulted in a missing value) and used only the
remaining 252 records (18% of their original sample) to develop
the Avaluator [10,11]. However, this listwise deletion approach is
appropriate if and only if the missing values occurred due to some
purely random process [10,12–14]. If the missing values occurred
because, for example, accident victims and eyewitnesses are more
likely to report the presence than the absence of obvious clues,
then the deletion of 82% of the accidents would shift the
distribution of the obvious clues towards more clues and result in
inflated prevention values.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. Different assumptions about
the meaning of missing values taken by researchers analyzing the
same and/or nearly the same accident data sets resulted in vastly
different distribution of the Obvious Clues. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of obvious clues in US avalanche accidents reported
when accidents with missing values are either included or
excluded. Three studies [11,7,15] which reported the distribution
of obvious clues based on all accidents in their sample found nearly
identical distributions of obvious clues. In contrast, the two studies
that excluded accidents due to missing values [11,8] reported
inconsistent results and obvious clue distributions that are markedly
shifted towards a higher number of clues. The substantial dif-
ferences observed between the distributions when accidents with
missing values are included vs. excluded strongly suggest that
missing values do not occur due to some random process but rather
are caused by victims, rescuers, and eyewitnesses not reporting the
absence of obvious clues.
Surprisingly, to our knowledge, no prior study has systematically
investigated whether eyewitnesses are likely to report the absence
of obvious conditions and behaviors of witnessed accidents that
increase the probability of accident and that, when present, would
be considered obvious clues of increased accident risk normally
noticed by all or nearly all observers. In the present study, we used
car accidents to examine the probability that eyewitnesses report
the presence vs. absence of obvious features of accidents.
Participants in the current study were shown video clips of car
accidents and subsequently asked to recall as much information as
they could remember about the accident. Subsequently, partici-
pant recalls were coded for the presence and absence of the
obvious clues to accident danger (e.g., snow, rain) and the
probabilities of reporting the presence vs. absence of the obvious
clues were calculated. To determine if the participants noticed and
remembered the status of the obvious clues that they failed to
report in their recalls, the participants were also given a multiple
choice accident questionnaire asking about various conditions and
behaviors observed in the witnessed accidents.
Methods
The study was approved by the Red Deer College Research
Ethics Board and all participants provided written informed
consent prior to participation in the study.
Participants and Design
Participants were 240 college students (mean age =22.4 years,
range =18 to 56 years with 89.5% of participants between 18 and
30 years of age). Fifty-nine were males and 180 were females, and
one did not disclose his/her gender. English was the first language
of 90.4% of participants.
For primary analyses, the design had one between-subjects
factor, the obvious clue condition, with three levels: no clues (i.e.,
no snow and no rain clue), rain clue (i.e., rain clue and no snow
clue), and snow clue (i.e., snow clue and no rain clue). For
secondary analyses, three additional obvious clues were considered
– reduced visibility, failure to yield, and distraction while driving –
for a total of five clues.
Materials
For primary analyses, eight car accidents were selected from
movies: four with no rain and no snow clues (no clues), two with
rain clue but no snow clue (rain clue), and two with snow clue but
no rain clue (snow clue). The no clue accidents were from Erin
Brockovich (2000), Driving Miss Daisy (1989), No Country For Old Men
(2007), and Changing Lanes (2002). The rain clue accidents were
both from Identity (2003). The snow clue accidents were from
Misery (1990) and The Human Stain (2003). The shortest clip was 14
s and the longest clip was 59 s long. All movie clips were presented
in their original DVD quality with sound turned on.
For secondary analyses, five obvious clues were considered: the
snow and rain clues (each present in two accidents) and three
additional clues that appeared in at least two of the eight movie
clips. The additional clues were: reduced visibility (visibility clue),
failure to yield (yield clue), and being distracted while driving
(distraction clue). The visibility clue was present in four accidents
Figure 1. Distributions of Obvious Clues with missing values
either included or excluded. Three studies ([11,7,15]) which
reported the distribution of the obvious clues based on all accidents
in their sample found nearly identical distributions of obvious clues. In
contrast, the two studies that excluded accidents due to missing values
– the Avaluator (82% of accidents excluded; [8]) and Floyer (71% of
accidents excluded; [11]) – reported obvious clue distributions that are
markedly shifted towards a higher number of clues.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012539.g001
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was present in five accidents (Identity Clip 1, Human Stain, Changing
Lanes, No Country For Old Men, Erin Brockovich), and the distraction
clue was present in three accidents (Identity Clip 1, Misery, Changing
Lanes). One accident (Driving Miss Daisy) had none of the five clues
present.
Procedure
As part of a larger study lasting 1.5 to 2 hours, participants
tested in small groups watched a randomly-assigned movie clip
and immediately thereafter their memory for accident details was
queried using undirected recall, directed recall, and an accident
questionnaire, in this order. Prior to watching the movies,
participants were told that they would be asked about the
accidents later. For undirected recall, participants were instructed
‘‘to write down as much as you can remember about what
happened in the movie clip. Please be specific and provide as
much detail as you can remember.’’ For directed recall,
participants were given the following instructions: ‘‘Imagine you
were approached by a police officer who wants to reconstruct the
accident you observed. Is there anything else you would like to
add? Please write it down, be specific, and provide as much detail
as you can remember.’’ The accident questionnaire examined
participants’ memory for various aspects of accidents including
driver, driver conditions, road conditions, and visibility, using
checklists. Participants were asked to mark all items on the
checklists that applied to the accident they saw. Finally,
participants were also asked to indicate whether or not they had
seen each movie clip previously.
Accident records (recall protocols) were coded for the presence
or absence of these ‘‘obvious clues’’ to accident danger (snow/ice,
rain, poor visibility, failure to yield, distraction) using the following
scale: Yes = the clue was present, Weak Yes = the clue was
probably present, DNK = presence or absence of the clue is
unclear from the record, Weak No = the clue was probably
absent, No = the clue was absent [15,16].
Results
The recall analyses below are from the first undirected recall.
The data from the second, directed recall did not change the
pattern of findings because participants rarely provided more
complete information about either the absence or presence of the
clues. Although some participants reported that they had seen
some of the movie clips previously, the exclusion of their data did
not alter the findings, and thus, their data were retained in the
analyses.
Primary Analyses
Figure 2 shows the proportion of participants reporting the
presence and absence of the rain and snow clues by clue condition
(No Clues, Rain Clue, Snow Clue) using the strict (Yes and No)
and liberal (Yes+Weak Yes and No+Weak No) criteria with error
bars indicating 95% Confidence Intervals. When the clues were
present, participants were very likely to report it (strict criteria:
p=.83, liberal criteria: p=.88). In contrast, when the clues were
absent, participants rarely reported their absence (strict criteria:
p=.04, liberal criteria: p=.08). No participants erroneously
reported the presence of the clues when they were actually absent
and similarly no participants erroneously reported the absence of
the clues when they were actually present.
Figure 3, panel A, shows the proportion of participants noticing
the status of clues – the presence of neither rain nor snow clue (No
Clues), the presence of rain clue (Rain) and the presence of snow
clue (Snow) – as revealed by their choices on the accident
questionnaire. The error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals.
The figure indicates that the vast majority of the participants
noticed the actual status of the clues – the absence of rain and
snow, the presence of rain, and the presence of snow – in the three
accident types (No Clues, Rain, Snow). Thus, participants’ failure
to report the absence of clues is not due to their failure to notice
and/or to encode their absence.
Figure 3, panel B, shows the proportion of participants
reporting the absence of rain and snow clues, the presence of
the rain clue, and the presence of the snow clue given that they
noticed the clue status (i.e., the proportion of participants who
reported on the clue status out of those who noticed their status as
indicated by their responses on the accident questionnaire). The
error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals. The data highlight
that even though the participants knew the clues were absent they
did not mention their absence. In contrast, when participants
knew the clues were present, they were very likely to mention their
presence.
Secondary Analyses
Figure 4 shows the proportion of participants reporting the
presence vs. absence of the five clues using the strict (Yes and
No) and liberal (Yes+Weak Yes and No+Weak No) criteria with
error bars indicating 95% Confidence Intervals. Participants
were very likely to report the presence of the obvious clues (strict
criteria: p=.84, liberal criteria: p=.87) and were very unlikely
to report their absence (strict criteria: p=.02, liberal criteria:
p=.05).
Figure 5 shows the prevalence of Yes (clue is present), Weak Yes
(clue is probably present), Unknown/DNK (presence or absence of
clue cannot be established), Weak No (clue is probably absent),
and No (clue is absent) judgments for the five clues. The DNK
portion highlights that accident reports themselves do not allow us
to determine the presence or absence of obvious clues for large
portions of accidents. However, the upwards pointing black
triangles in the figure show the true prevalence of the obvious clues
in the movie clips shown to the participants. Consistent with the
analyses above, the vast majority of missing values (DNK, yellow
portion) in analyses of the accident records occurred because the
clue was actually absent.
Discussion
This study revealed several important findings. First, eyewit-
nesses reported the presence of present obvious clues and only
rarely reported the absence of absent obvious clues. In turn, the
accident records themselves do not allow researchers to determine
whether clues were present or absent in the vast majority of cases,
resulting in many missing values. Second, the multiple choice test
results revealed that eyewitnesses were fully aware that the obvious
clues to accident danger were absent but failed to report their
absence. Thus, failure to report the absence of absent clues is not
due to eyewitnesses not noticing their absence. Rather, one of the
principal mechanisms causing missing values is eyewitnesses’
tendency not to talk about the absence of obvious clues. Third, the
vast majority of missing values occurred because the obvious clues
were actually absent. In turn, the estimated prevalence of the
obvious clues under the assumption that the missing values mean
the absence of the clues was very close to the actual prevalence for
all of the obvious clues.
The current results are consistent with the findings of Uttl,
Henry, and Uttl [15]. Uttl et al. analyzed avalanche accident
records for the presence or absence of the Obvious Clues using the
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not be determined in the vast majority of accidents because
victims, rescuers, and eyewitnesses did not mention anything about
their presence or absence. More importantly, using external
objective weather records and avalanche bulletin data issued at the
time of accidents, they found that for at least the two clues –
Unstable Snow and Thaw – missing values meant that the clues
were actually absent. In combination, these findings indicate that
the listwise deletion of 82% of accident records by Haegeli and
McCammon [8,9] in the development of the Avaluator was
inappropriate as the missing values were caused by eyewitnesses
and rescuers not reporting the absence of absent clues.
Our study is the first one to systematically examine whether
eyewitnesses are more likely to report the presence vs. absence of
obvious features and behaviors and is limited by the use of car
accidents only. However, as noted above, our results are consistent
with the conclusions reached by Uttl et al. [15] for real-life
avalanche accident records based on eyewitness accounts of
victims, bystanders, and rescuers rather than laboratory findings
with college students. They are also consistent with the findings
by Lindsay et al. [4] for eyewitness descriptions of perpetrators
of crime. Thus, we expect our results to generalize to other
populations, other accident types, as well as other eyewitness
situations.
Figure 2. Reporting the presence vs. absence of the rain and snow clues. The proportions of participants reporting the presence vs. absence
of the rain (panels A and C) and snow (panels B and D) by the clue condition (No Clues, Rain Clue, Snow Clue) using the strict (Yes and No; panels A
and B) and liberal (Yes+Weak Yes and No+Weak No, panels C and D) criteria. Participants were very likely to report the presence of the clues but rarely
reported the absence of the clues.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012539.g002
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applicable to only obvious features of accidents and behaviors, that
is, those features that any victim, observer, or investigator is sure to
notice and consider relevant. For example, a skier working his or
her way for hours through 50 cm of fresh snow is nearly certain to
encode the presence of fresh snow (so-called Snow Loading clue of
the Avaluator’s Obvious Clues Method) and likely to report its
presence due to its high relevance to avalanche accidents and their
outcomes. These findings are not applicable to the interpreta-
tion of missing values that may have occurred because victims,
eyewitnesses, or investigators did not notice the specific features or
behavior.
Figure 4. Reporting the presence vs. absence of the five clues.
The proportion of participants reporting the presence vs. absence of
the five clues (snow, rain, visibility, yield, distraction) using the strict (Yes
and No, panel A) and liberal (Yes+Weak Yes and No+Weak No, panel B)
criteria. For all five clues, participants were very likely to report the
presence of the clues but rarely reported the absence of the clues.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012539.g004
Figure 5. Reported vs. actual status of the five clues. The
proportions of accidents falling into each of the five clue status coding
categories (Yes/Present, Weak Yes/Probably Present, DNK/Status is
indeterminate, Weak No/Probably absent, No/Absent) for the five clues
and the true status of the clues (marked by the triangles). The vast
majority of missing values (i.e., DNK, yellow portions) occurred because
the clues were actually absent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012539.g005
Figure 3. Noticing and reporting clue status. Panel A shows the
proportions of participants noticing clue status by the clue condition.
Panel B shows the proportions of participants reporting the clue status
given that they noticed the status by the clue condition. Participants
noticed the absence of the clues but choose to not report it.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012539.g003
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models of eyewitness memory as well as accident victims’
behavior. Although the model of tractor fatalities may be valid
[5], the Avaluator’s behavioral recommendations based on the
Obvious Clues distribution in historical avalanche accidents are
likely invalid and dangerous [15,16,10]. List-wise deletion of 82%
of data due to missing values (which is also, incidentally, the
default behavior of some of the most widely-used statistical
programs such as SPSS) will rarely result in unbiased statistics and
certainly not if eyewitnesses are far more likely to report the
presence than the absence of obvious clues as suggested by the
present study.
These findings have different implications for conducting
retrospective analyses of historical records vs. prospective analyses
of future accidents and events (including experimental studies
of memory). Historical records are limited to the information
gathered by record keepers at the time and researchers are
unable to go back in time and inquire about the features and
behaviors of interest. When missing values occur because the
records do not contain the sought-after information, researchers
should first attempt to establish the meaning of missing values
from external data whenever possible (e.g., from historical
weather data, see Uttl et al. [15]). Alternatively, if the meaning
of missing values cannot be established, researchers may impute
missing data using clearly specified assumptions about the
meaning of missing values. Unfortunately, if the chosen assump-
tions are wrong, so too will be the researchers’ interpretations of
their findings.
To illustrate, in the development of the Avaluator, Haegeli and
McCammon [8,17] assumed, without stating so, that missing
values occurred due to some purely random process (i.e., in
technical terms, were missing completely at random, [13,14,18]),
that is, that the 82% of accidents they excluded from their analyses
were no different from the 18% of accidents that they retained.
Based on the remaining accident records, Haegeli and McCam-
mon [8] concluded that 77% of accidents occurred when 5, 6 or 7
of the Obvious Clues were present (see Figure 1), and therefore, if
the historical victims had avoided slopes with 5 or more of the
Obvious Clues, 77% of the accidents would not have occurred
(i.e., the use of the Avaluator’s behavioral recommendation would
result in a 77% relative risk reduction for the victims being
involved in avalanche accidents). In turn, every student in
Avalanche Safety Training courses in Canada approved by
Canadian Avalanche Association has been given the Avaluator
[19] and taught that slopes with 0 to 4 clues are relatively safe
whereas slopes with 5 or more clues are dangerous and should be
avoided [8,20]. However, as shown by the present study as well as
Uttl et al’s [15] findings using historical weather data, Haegeli and
McCammon’s [8] implicit assumption is incorrect and, in this
instance, the missing values arose primarily because victims,
eyewitnesses, and rescuers did not report the absence of obvious
clues. Accordingly, if accidents with missing data are not excluded
and missing values are imputed with zeros (i.e., absence of
Obvious Clues), the obtained distribution of the Obvious Clues is
shifted towards a much lower number of clues (see Figure 1) and
the behavioral recommendations are vastly different. To avoid
approximately 80% of historical accidents (i.e., achieve 80%
relative risk reduction), victims would have to avoid slopes with 3
or more clues and only slopes with 0, 1, or 2 clues could be
considered relatively safe (see Figure 1).
In contrast, for prospective analyses of future accidents and
events, researchers are best advised to use structured interviews or
multiple choice questionnaires that directly ask victims, eyewitness,
and investigators whether certain features or behaviors of interest
were present or absent. Indeed this is the approach increasingly
taken in investigations of motor vehicle accidents where
investigators are often required to complete multiple choice
questionnaires asking about every conceivable piece of informa-
tion that may be of interest in the future.
More generally, our study underscores the importance of
reporting the extent of missing values as well as patterns of their
distribution, to consider why missing values occurred and their
meaning, and to consider the impact of their treatment (e.g.,
deletion, replacement with zeros) on statistical description and
inference [18,12,14,21,22]. A failure to do so may lead not only to
unreplicable findings but also to dangerous public policies based
on the esoteric properties of small and unrepresentative accident
samples resulting from data exclusion due to missing values
[10,15,16,23,24].
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